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According to intelligence estimates, 
there are around 1,400 European children 
in Syria and Iraq, many of them born 
there. The fate of these children 
confronts European governments with 
moral, legal, political, diplomatic and 
security dilemmas. Governments are 
divided over the issue, but almost all are 
reluctant to address it head-on. None 
have taken a proactive stance with regard 
to these children, creating several 
security voids. This policy brief looks 
into the fate of these European children 
before exploring in more detail the 
situation of the Belgians among them. It 
analyses the position of the Belgian 
government with regard to repatriation 
and reviews existing policies concerning 
returning children. The authors end up 
with a number of recommendations for 
Belgian and European authorities, 
including a plea for a more proactive 
response. 
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The self-declared “caliphate” of the Islamic 
State (ISIS) is no longer. However, the fallout 
from this failed state project will be felt for 
many years to come. The issue of children 
who lived in Syria and Iraq or were born there 
is gaining traction in Europe. Discussions on 
their repatriation and handling upon return are 
confronting European authorities with 
difficult dilemmas and challenges. 
 
BRING BACK OUR CHILDREN? 
EUROPE’S DILEMMAS 
Figures That Matter  .  .  .  
According to the latest European intelligence 
estimates, some 5,300 European men and 
women have travelled to the Levant to join a 
jihadi group since 2012. Some 1,000 children 
have accompanied their parents on their 
journey to Syria and Iraq. In the years that 
followed, an additional 600 are estimated to 
have been born in the region to at least one 
European parent. This brings to 6,900 the 
overall European contingent once present in 
Syria and Iraq.  
 
The fate of the children is intimately linked to 
that of their parents. It is generally assumed 
that about a third of all EU citizens that 
travelled to the Levant have returned home, 
some of them with children. Some of those 
remaining in the region are fighting in the last 
ISIS strongholds, and a few have joined other 
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jihadi war theatres. A small proportion, around 
140, are in Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF, a 
Kurdish militia) detention camps in Syria or 
awaiting trial in Iraq. However, many probably 
did not survive the intense bombing 
campaigns and the heavy fighting in both Syria 
and Iraq. At least 1,000 foreign terrorist 
fighters (FTF) are believed to have been killed. 
That should leave a maximum of around 2,500 
European FTFs in the Levant, but probably 
much fewer. 
 
In contrast to adults, less than ten percent of 
the children have come (back) to Europe so 
far. Around 130 children are reported to have 
returned, mostly below the age of eight. 
France has been the destination of the 
majority of those returns. Around 1,400 
children from EU parents are thus assumed to 
remain in the Levant, according to European 
intelligence sources. The whereabouts of most 
of them is actually unknown. Many are likely 
to be still in the combat zones. Some are still 
with their parents, who are fighting or fleeing. 
An uncertain number are probably roaming 
unaccompanied, possibly orphaned. And 
probably an even greater number did not 
survive the war, being victims of bombs, 
diseases or malnutrition.  
 
The actual number of European children that 
could still potentially return is therefore highly 
uncertain, but in all likelihood it will be only a 
fraction of the aforementioned 1,400 figure. 
Adding to this uncertainty, numbers circulating 
among intelligence services are famously 
unreliable. On the one hand, there is certainly a 
degree of double-counting, as a number of 
children were born from two European 
parents of different nationalities (Belgian and 
French, for instance). As these children can 
claim both nationalities, they are counted by 
the services of both countries, thus inflating 
the overall figure. On the other hand, a 
number of children born in the Levant are 
most likely unknown to the authorities, thus 
underestimating the contingent.  
 
.  .  .  and Matters  to Figure Out 
Although (most) EU governments consider 
children – at least, those under a certain age – 
to be victims, none has taken a proactive 
position on their repatriation. No European 
government actively intervenes to have them 
(and their mothers) exfiltrated, let alone 
considers undertaking challenging search 
operations. Some Member States have made a 
few exceptions for children detained in Iraq, 
but not in Syria. Whereas Russia or Indonesia 
have repatriated a handful of families with 
children from Syria, EU Member States have 
not done it so far, although some countries are 
rumoured to be in advanced talks with Kurdish 
militias.1 
 
The authorities’ dilemmas are multi-faceted. 
Morally and legally, governments feel 
compelled to help these children. Unlike their 
Table 1: European FTFs and children currently 
assumed in the Levant or returned 
In Syria/Iraq 
Adult FTFs 2,500 
Children 1,400 
Returned 
Adult FTFs 1,500 
Children 130 
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parents, they cannot be held responsible for 
their actions and are, in fact, mostly victims of 
their own parents. France even criminalises 
and prosecutes parents who took their 
children to fight the jihad. Considering their 
vulnerability, under international humanitarian 
law all children affected by armed conflict are 
entitled to special respect and protection, 
although the obligation of repatriation is 
subject to debate.2 Yet, in the absence of 
reaction from EU governments, in spite of 
their moral responsibility and legal obligations, 
families have requested the help of NGOs and 
international organisations, in particular, the 
International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC), to visit Internally Displaced Persons 
(IDP) camps and to restore contact with 
mothers and children present there. At their 
request, the ICRC also notifies their presence 
to the authorities, hence providing useful and 
objective information about their whereabouts 
and intentions. 
 
The evolution of the situation on the ground 
put further pressure on European 
governments. Conditions are dire in SDF 
camps where about 40 European children are 
located, and cases of tuberculosis have been 
reported by families in Europe. Although they 
have freedom of movement, these women and 
children have nowhere to go as the Turkish 
border is very difficult to cross. Cells in Iraq 
are reported to be overcrowded. No 
professional psychological support structures 
are available to assist children in overcoming 
the war traumas most undoubtedly endured 
for a significant amount of time. According to 
Human Rights Watch, children as young as 
nine have even started to be prosecuted and 
convicted during expedite trials in Iraq, 
contrary to international law.3 This has not, 
however, concerned European children so far.  
Politically, EU governments might be aligned 
with their public opinion, which shows an 
overall reluctance to facilitate the return of 
FTFs from the Levant, although it is far less 
clear whether that public mood applies to 
children as well. Diplomatically, the issue is a 
headache, considering that Kurdish militias 
have no international recognition, making any 
negotiation more complicated (though not 
impossible). The Iraqi authorities are eager to 
implement their sovereign rights to prosecute 
combatants (including children) who have 
committed atrocities on their territory. The 
issue of consular assistance for European 
citizens in detention also regularly appears on 
the table. 
 
The most important dilemma of all, however, 
is security. The authorities’ reluctance to 
address head-on the issue of returning children 
is driven by several considerations. One is the 
uncertainty and the inherent difficulty of 
reintegrating children back into European 
societies after they have lived in an ultraviolent 
environment. The older they are, the more 
they have been exposed to ISIS’s ideological 
indoctrination (starting from six-years-old for 
boys and girls)4 and military preparation 
(starting from nine-years-old, for boys only). 
Another unknown is the potential attitude of 
the parents. If not deradicalised or at least 
disengaged from terrorist violence, they risk 
educating their children in a hostile and 
violence-prone attitude towards the country to 
which they have returned. There is thus a fear 
of bringing back “ticking time bombs” in the 
words of Patrick Calvar, former chief of the 
French domestic intelligence service (DGSI).5 
A French returning FTF recently explained 
that some people within ISIS had imagined 
training children specifically with the purpose 
of perpetrating attacks in Europe upon their 
return.6 
 
Nevertheless, security services also point at 
possible long-term security challenges if the 
issue is kept in limbo, creating security voids in 
the near future. Growing up in detention 
camps without any prospect risks creating a 
generation of frustrated and resentful 
teenagers. This is the ideal condition for 
constituting a stateless reserve contingent for 
jihadi and criminal organisations alike. As the 
infamous Bucca camp in Iraq illustrates, 
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detention camps have acted as boosters for 
jihadi networking and mobilisation in the past, 
ultimately facilitating the creation of ISIS. 
 
Another security risk highlighted recently by 
press accounts concerns prisoner swap deals 
between the SDF and ISIS. Being unable to 
look after great numbers of prisoners, the SDF 
has engaged in the exchange of ISIS-linked 
prisoners in their camps with Kurdish 
prisoners held by ISIS. Such swap deals not 
only reinforce the military ranks of ISIS, but 
possibly also force women (with children) who 
had possibly rejected ISIS back into the arms 
of this organisation. 
 
Another possible risk with similar adverse 
consequences might be the sudden release of 
SDF-held prisoners, something the SDF has 
threatened to do. The SDF might indeed end 
up taking such a decision as a result of the 
impossibility of taking care of great numbers 
of prisoners, because of growing pressure 
from hostile forces (Turkish Army, Syrian 
Army, jihadi groups) on the ground, but also 
due to the lack of cooperation from the home 
countries of these prisoners. Finally, ISIS and 
other jihadi groups have successfully organised 
both small and massive prison breaks in the 
past, which succeeded in reinforcing their 
ranks with revengeful new recruits, giving a 
new boost to the organisation. 
 
Overall, various dilemmas have pushed EU 
governments into a passive approach of 
dealing with returning children on a case-by-
case basis, but not seeking actively their 
repatriation. The tide seems to be turning, 
however. The security implications of inaction 
are becoming increasingly obvious, while the 
short-term risk associated with returns of 
children and adults are mitigated by an 
increasingly efficient (if imperfect) handling by 
the various relevant services. Indeed, 130 
children have already returned to Europe. 
While requiring intensive care and continuous 
monitoring, including risk assessments, these 
children are clearly victims first and foremost. 
However, inaction or improper handling could 
still turn these young children into a security 
liability.7 Returning children, as returning 
fighters, constitute a long-term challenge that 
requires long-term commitment.  
 
More importantly, independently from a shift 
of policy on repatriation, more children will 
return home by their own means, and they will 
need to be taken care of. In the next section, 
we look at the Belgian situation to better 
understand the scope of the challenge and the 
nature of the debates in one specific country, 
but also to examine the measures already in 
place or under discussion to deal with 
returning children, and the challenges that 
remain ahead.  
 
THE BELGIAN APPROACH TO THE 
CHILDREN 
Belg ian chi ldren in the Levant 
According to the Belgian Coordination Unit 
for Threat Analysis (CUTA), the national 
counter-terrorism fusion centre, there are an 
estimated 162 children linked to Belgium in 
Syria and Iraq as of May 2018, including 13 
teenagers (aged 12-18 and thus listed as FTF). 
These are children of whom at least one parent 
was a Belgian citizen or resident. If we add the 
22 minors who have already returned since 
2012,8 this brings the Belgian contingent of 
children to 184 individuals. In a recent 
interview, the Mayor of Vilvoorde claimed that 
the figure could be even higher, considering 
that 25 children born in Syria are from his 
town alone.9  
 
Among the 149 children below 12-years-old 
still present in Syria/Iraq, 80 percent were 
born there whereas 20 percent travelled to the 
region with their parents. The vast majority of 
these children, about 85 percent, are therefore 
very young (below six-years-old) and have not 
been educated or trained militarily under the 
caliphate.10 Some older children might have 
been more exposed to ISIS ideology, however, 
and a handful of young boys are likely to have 
been trained. This comes in addition to the 13 
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FTF teenagers who are still in the region and 
have possibly participated in combat.  
 
These numbers are approximate, based upon 
the best information available to the 
authorities. The reality is less clear-cut. As with 
the other European children in the Levant, the 
fate of the children of Belgian nationals is 
largely unknown, with the exception of the 14 
children formally identified in SDF-run IDP 
camps in Syria (allegedly none are detained in 
Iraq). Intelligence services are relatively certain 
about a small number of children having 
perished, but most have disappeared 
altogether from the services’ radar. They might 
wander unidentified in the region or have 
succumbed to bombings and fighting, disease 
or malnutrition, given the worsening situation 
in the region. They may also be hiding with 
their parents. 
 
It is thus impossible to predict how many of 
the children in the region will eventually 
return, and when. Their fate will partly depend 
on the Belgian government’s response, on the 
evolution of the situation on the ground, and 
on their own ability to cross the border to 
Turkey (possibly with the support of their 
families or international organisations). A few 
families with children have already reached 
Turkey to wait to be allowed to return, a 
process complicated by the absence of an 
extradition agreement between Brussels and 
Ankara. More families with children (up to 30 
persons) have expressed their intention to 
return as well, but must travel at their own 
peril outside the conflict zone. The group of 
children officially identified in SDF camps 
could possibly be repatriated, if the Belgian 
government decided so (see below). Kurdish 
militants are losing patience, however. Recent 
news of exchanges of prisoners between 
Kurdish forces and ISIS fighters has raised 
concerns that Belgian FTFs with children 
could also be sent back to ISIS territory as part 
of such deals.11  
 
Administrative burdens will add further layers 
of difficulty for returning children. Not all of 
them will be granted Belgian citizenship, 
particularly if their parent(s) have passed away. 
For the children born in the Levant from a 
Belgian mother, citizenship should be granted 
automatically if the DNA tests are positive. 
But for those born of a Belgian father, positive 
DNA results will be insufficient if the marriage 
 
149	  
81%	  
20	  
11%	  
2	  
1%	  
13	  
7%	  
Figure 1: The children of  Belgian nationals in the Levant 
children	  (0-­‐12)	  in	  Syria/Iraq	   children	  (0-­‐12)	  returnees	  
teenagers	  (12-­‐18)	  returnees	   teenagers	  (12-­‐18)	  in	  Syria/Iraq	  
Source: CUTA, May 2018. 
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was not recognised by the Belgian 
administration (which is the case for religious 
unions celebrated under the caliphate), or if 
the father did not officially recognise the child. 
The fact that DNA tests are expected to 
precede repatriation, and therefore to be 
performed in Syria/Iraq, can be a major hurdle 
to their recognition.  
 
The challenge posed by minors in Syria and 
Iraq, and their possible return, has been a 
topic of discussion in Belgium as in other 
countries. To the credit of the Belgian federal 
government, it was among the first Western 
governments to take a relatively clear position 
on the situation of these children.12 The 
government decided in December 2017 that 
Belgian children should be treated as victims 
until the age of ten, and therefore allowed to 
return. Those aged 10 to 18 are treated on a 
case-by-case basis (including with regard to the 
permission to return) since they could also 
represent a security threat.13  
 
Since that decision of principle, however, the 
coalition government has not been able to 
reach an agreement on the modalities of these 
repatriations, leaving it up to the families to 
bring the children at their own peril to a 
consulate or embassy (i.e. in Turkey in most 
cases, since Belgium has no diplomatic 
presence in Syria or Iraq). This is 
understandably a complex issue, as outlined in 
the previous section. The government seems 
to be torn between two distinct arguments. On 
the one hand, adult FTFs are not welcome 
back, as clearly stated by the Minister of 
Interior Jan Jambon in early 2018: their return 
is “not in the strategic interest of the country”. 
On the other hand, this position does not 
automatically extend to the foreign fighters’ 
children, as the Minister of Justice Koen 
Geens declared that it is the government’s 
“obligation” to bring back Belgian children.14 
 
These two arguments are at least partly in 
contradiction and certainly complicate the 
operationalisation of the Belgian position of 
principle. Indeed, repatriating children without 
their parents is legally and morally debatable. 
Should children be repatriated with their 
parents, to avoid a traumatic separation, or 
could the children be repatriated separately 
with the consent of (one) parent? The arrest 
warrants issued against the parents are another 
complicating factor: proactively arranging the 
return of individuals subject to such a warrant 
from third countries that have no extradition 
agreement with Belgium may not be 
impossible, but is certainly difficult if not 
unprecedented.  
 
Recently, a number of actors have started 
increasing the pressure on the government to 
transform the position of principle into a more 
proactive policy. This is notably the case of the 
francophone Delegate General for the Rights 
of Children and his Flemish counterpart, the 
UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and 
protection of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms while countering terrorism, and of 
associations of mothers of (grand-)children in 
Syria/Iraq.15 Some signals have also emerged 
from the government suggesting a possible 
evolution. For instance, the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs Didier Reynders has stated on 
several occasions that Belgium should play a 
more proactive role in this sensitive issue, in 
line with international law and principles, 
particularly since the election of Belgium as a 
non-permanent member of the UN Security 
Council in June 2018.16 The extent of these 
international obligations is, however, still 
subject to internal discussions. 
 
Whether the government changes its position 
or not, some children have already returned 
and more will follow. Authorities should 
therefore seriously plan for it. However, there 
is no clear strategy to handle them so far. 
 
Returning chi ldren in Belg ium 
Twenty-two children (including two teenagers) 
have already returned to Belgium. Fourteen of 
them were under three-years-old upon their 
return. All have suffered from multiple 
 7 
 
EGMONT Royal Institute for International Relations 
 
traumas. In addition to these children, at least 
one woman returned pregnant. Since regional 
entities are exclusively competent on youth 
matters in Belgium, this further means that 
Flanders and Wallonia-Brussels have only 
handled about ten cases each so far. Given this 
limited number of cases, which ranged over 
several years, no systematic approach exists yet 
to accompany these children upon their return. 
Each child has been treated on a case-by-case 
basis.  
 
In the absence of any clear strategy, the 
prevailing procedure is the one applied in 
cases of endangered minors or child abuses. 
Only very recently, tentative discussions on 
specific procedures for returning children have 
been initiated. The main institutional actors 
(and rules) are therefore still those dealing with 
children, and not the specialised services in 
radicalisation and terrorism.17  
 
Upon arrival, children are immediately 
checked by a medical team to verify if any 
urgent care is required. Then begins a 
reinsertion trajectory that is mainly guided by 
three criteria: age, family situation and life-
experience. 
 
In terms of age, the main distinction lies 
between those under ten-years-old, who fall 
under childcare protection measures, and 
those between 10- and 18-years-old who can 
be subject to judiciary or security measures. In 
the first category, children can stay with their 
mothers in prison until the age of three (if the 
mother is jailed as a returnee), in order to 
avoid a traumatic separation between the child 
and the mother, not least given that prison 
sentences are relatively short. This has indeed 
been implemented on several occasions, but 
not systematically. In the second category, 
from 12-years-old,18 minors can be 
incarcerated in juvenile institutions generally 
for two to four months, following a decision 
by a youth judge, usually followed by intensive 
accompaniment possibly over several years. 
From 16-years-old, the minor can also be 
prosecuted as an adult for terrorist acts 
committed after his sixteenth birthday.19 
 
With regard to the family situation, in line with 
international standards, the overall preference 
is to maintain young children in their family 
environment. The situation will therefore 
depend on whether the child’s parents are still 
alive and in Belgium, whether they will be sent 
to jail and for how long, or whether they are 
still considered to carry extremist ideas or 
intentions and possibly constitute a danger for 
the child (radicalisation could be interpreted as 
a form of abuse or mistreatment, parents can 
be suspected of planning to travel again with 
the child to conflict zones, etc.). If the child 
must be separated from his parents, he can be 
placed with his extended family (generally with 
the grand-parents, a number of whom are 
actively seeking their repatriation). This has 
been the most common scenario so far. The 
challenge for the authorities is to assess both 
the family’s ability to take care of these 
traumatised children, on the one hand, but also 
to ensure that the extended family is not itself 
involved in extremism, which is why 
continuous monitoring and assessment is 
required. Ultimately, children can be placed in 
a foster family or institution. A particular 
challenge arises for the placement of families 
with several brothers and sisters. While the 
preference is to keep the families united, it is 
not always possible for the extended or foster 
families to accommodate three or four 
children. The separation of these siblings can 
then create an additional significant trauma. 
 
Finally, the childcare approach must take into 
account the specific experience of children 
under the caliphate. Every child will have 
suffered a series of traumas, from exposure to 
violence and cruelty to the loss of a family 
member. Some girls may have been raped and 
some young boys may have been forced to 
commit violent acts. Poor sanitary conditions 
on the ground, potential detention in Syria or 
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Iraq, or the difficult journey back to Europe 
are equally unsettling. Upon return, the 
potential separation from the mother and 
siblings as well as stigmatisation from society 
(in school, for instance) can create more 
traumas. Every child should be cared for with 
special attention to the psychological impact of 
these individual traumas and should be closely 
accompanied in their (re)integration into a safe 
environment. This requires a tailor-made 
approach for every child, requiring a large 
number of actors to coordinate their efforts. 
Relevant actors include a youth judge (who 
can impose certain measures), youth services, 
psychiatrists, but also actors specialised in 
family support, as well as those working on 
radicalisation (such as the local or regional 
prevention services who can also share their 
expertise in secondary and tertiary prevention), 
and the security services (who can share useful 
information about the life experience of the 
children in Syria/Iraq and the situation of their 
families). Specific arrangements to that effect 
have been created and recently reinforced to 
facilitate information-sharing among 
stakeholders. In some places these are working 
smoothly, but in other places they continue to 
be hampered by issues of professional/medical 
secrecy and security confidentiality. Some 
actors, in particular those working on 
prevention and child protection, are reluctant 
to share information on individual cases, 
fearing that these exchanges with security 
services would adversely impact on the 
relations of confidence and trust with the 
persons they accompany.  
 
Overall, there is no strategy to coordinate all 
these actors. The current approach in Belgium 
thus remains sub-optimal. This contrasts with 
the experience of other countries (notably 
France), which have established relatively 
detailed protocols explicating the role of each 
actor at every stage – although these countries 
are still learning by doing and encounter many 
challenges in the implementation of these 
protocols.20 
 
THE WAY FORWARD 
To this day, few children have returned from 
Syria and Iraq to Europe. However, as a result 
of the evolution of the situation on the ground, 
following the fall of the caliphate, a certain 
number of Europeans, in particular families 
with children, are seeking to return. It is hard 
to predict how many will do so and when. But 
it seems obvious that the number of returning 
children will indeed increase – with or without 
the assistance of the authorities. It is therefore 
urgent to devise a clear strategy with regard to 
these children. We make a number of 
recommendations based on the Belgian 
experience, but a number of these could apply 
to other EU countries as well. 
 
• Clarify (and implement) the repatriation procedure: 
Most Belgian children in Syria/Iraq are 
below six-years-old. This is significant 
because it means that they have not been 
educated or trained by ISIS. Moreover, 
they are still in a very early phase of 
socialisation and identity formation, mostly 
learning by imitation. As a result, they are 
able to (re-)adapt and (re-)adjust to 
Western societies.21 However, the more 
time they spend in a hostile environment, 
the more they could be further traumatised 
and possibly groomed for hatred against 
the West. In other words, most of these 
children are not “time bombs” yet, as some 
have claimed, but they could become so if 
not repatriated quickly. 
 
• Develop a coherent strategy to handle returning 
children: Independently of the repatriation 
policy, more children will return in the 
coming months. So far, the Belgian 
approach has been largely based on 
existing practices and models. However, 
the singularity of these children, and 
perhaps more importantly the fact that we 
are able to anticipate their return, call for a 
more strategic approach. A clear 
methodology with a clear division of 
labour should be devised step by step. The 
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key principles for such a strategy should 
be: anticipation, comprehensiveness, 
multi-agency and long-term. (1) 
Anticipation refers to the fact that 
authorities already have some information, 
even if scant, on these children and their 
families before they actually return, and 
they can therefore prepare tailored 
measures, to be further developed and 
finetuned upon return. (2) 
Comprehensiveness suggests that the 
approach should focus on a wide range of 
aspects including medical care, psychiatric 
care, social and educational support, family 
support and possibly security measures. (3) 
Multi-agency means that many different 
services (youth, medical, social, 
educational, security) will be involved in 
the handling of these children, and should 
therefore have a platform through which 
they could exchange and coordinate their 
efforts. Some platforms already exist in the 
context of radicalisation (in Belgium this is 
the case with the Local Integrated Security 
Cells [LISC]), which could be used, but 
other platforms could also be used or, if 
needed, created. (4) Long-term reflects the 
reality that returning children will require 
support for many years. As is common 
with poly-traumatised children, they will 
experience ups and downs throughout 
their childhood. When young children 
become teenagers, they may become 
curious about their past, about their 
(deceased) parents, about their (missing) 
siblings, etc. These constant challenges 
require a long-term commitment from the 
authorities, transparency in administrative 
procedures and lasting cooperation with 
the (foster) families.  
 
• Capitalise on the existing experience: Today’s 
returning children from Syria/Iraq 
represent a particular challenge, but some 
EU countries, including Belgium, already 
have some experience with young children 
seeking asylum from war-torn countries. 
These children present a number of 
traumas that are similar to those of 
returning children. Belgium has even 
provided asylum to former child-soldiers in 
the past. Lessons can certainly be drawn 
from these various experiences – in terms 
of good (and less good) practices. Given 
that youth matters are a regional 
competence in Belgium, possibly resulting 
in different regional approaches, more 
exchanges should be organised between 
authorities from Flanders and Wallonia-
Brussels. There is surprisingly very little 
inter-regional coordination on youth 
policies. Beyond Belgium, a lot could be 
learned from exchanges with other 
countries that are dealing with similar 
challenges today (notably France, 
Netherlands or Germany) or that have 
faced similar situations in the past. 
 
• Enhance the information position on children and 
mothers: A more proactive policy on 
children necessitates a stronger 
information position. Currently, authorities 
have only a grainy picture of the situation 
of children and their families in the Levant. 
Knowledge of the situation of the 
extended family context in Belgium (as in 
the rest of the EU) is not always optimal 
either. More information would be 
available to authorities if a concerted effort 
is undertaken to combine different sources, 
including families, local authorities, 
international organisations and security 
services.  
 
• Now is the time to act: This is understandably 
a complex issue. But all things considered, 
it is preferable to address the issue now 
when it still appears manageable (however 
challenging), rather than leave it in limbo 
and risk it worsening as time passes. In our 
previous study on returning fighters,22 we 
have highlighted that we are entering into a 
new phase rather than having reached the 
end of jihadism. The collapse of ISIS’s 
state project has opened a window of 
opportunity to address the environment 
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that is conducive to radicalisation and 
violent extremism, and to reduce the scope 
and likelihood of a new jihadi mobilisation 
in the future. Dealing promptly with the 
issue of children who have both already 
returned and who will return is part and 
parcel of this challenge. For jihadi 
organisations, children born and raised 
under the caliphate represent an 
investment in the future; they are the 
“cubs” that will become tomorrow’s 
“lions”. Through proactive policies and a 
more positive narrative around returning 
children, European governments can show 
that they treat children not as animals 
(“cubs”) but as human beings and citizens. 
This can send a powerful message to the 
parents and family, and to the broader 
Muslim community that all children are 
equal. The “ticking” that some officials are 
hearing need not be that of “time bombs”, 
but rather the one that precedes a 
necessary wake-up call. 
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